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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the meaningfulness of pointing in great apes. We
appeal to Hannah Ginsborg’s conception of primitive normativity, which
provides an adequate criterion for establishing whether a response is
meaningful, and we attempt to make room for a conception according to
which there is no fundamental difference between the responses of
human infants and those of other great apes to pointing gestures. This
conception is an alternative to Tomasello’s view that pointing gestures
and reactions to them reveal a fundamental difference between humans
and other apes.
KEYWORDS: Gestures; Normativity; Intentionality; Pointing.

1. Introduction
In studies discussing animal cognition findings, the question of whether
referentiality is present in other species is a source of controversy. We know,
for example, that many animals (such as vervet monkeys, meerkats and
chimpanzees, to name a few) use alarm calls in response to predators (Hollén &
Radford 2009). One of the questions arising in relation to these findings is
whether such calls count as genuinely referential signals. As Macedonia and
Evans put it, “it may seem self-evident that an animal emitting an alarm call in
†
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response to an approaching raptor is communicating something about aerial
predators to conspecifics. This need not be the case. Such a vocalization could,
for example, be a manifestation of the fear or panic associated with the threat of
predation” (1993, p. 187). Alarm cries are referential if they convey something
about the environment, and they are motivational if they express the caller’s
emotional state (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2003; Marler et al., 1992; Seyfarth et al.,
1980; Radick, 2008). If alarm calls turn out to be about the environment,
rather than just expressions of affective states, they may be legitimately deemed
intentional. Intentionality is defined as “the power of minds to be about, to
represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs” (Jacob,
2010). Because intentional signals are an essential part of cognitive accounts
of communication, if alarm calls are intentional, they may be investigated as
instances of full-blown communicative acts, roughly analogous to linguistic
utterances.
Vocalizations, however, are not the only phenomena that raise questions
about intentionality; they are, after all, only one kind of putatively meaningful
behavior. Recently there has been a growing interest in the nature of gestures
in primates (Liebal et al., 2007; Call & Tomasello, 2007). Pika and Liebal
identify three characteristics of gestures in non-human primates based on
recent data: first, we are dealing with “open-ended, multi-faceted gestural
repertoires, including species distinctive and species-indistinctive gestures;”
second, apes “use gestures as flexibly produced intentional strategies, based on
key characteristics utilized in studies of intentional communication in human
children;” third, apes “develop group specific traditions of gesture” (2012, p.
3). In light of these findings, we believe that an adequate investigation of
intentionality in other creatures should be focused on gestures, rather than
vocalizations. In fact, given that gestures seem to be richer as well as more
flexible than vocalizations, it would seem that taking gestures, rather than
vocalizations, as the locus of intentionality in animal signals is a more
promising line of investigation. Tomasello writes:
I personally do not see how anyone can doubt that ape gestures — in all of
their flexibility and sensitivity to the attention of the other — and not ape
vocalizations – in all of their inflexibility and ignoring of others — are the
original font from which the richness and complexities of human
communication and language have flowed. (2008, p. 55)

We are sympathetic with Tomasello on this point, but we disagree on the
way in which the “flexibility and sensitivity to the attention of the other”
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characteristic of ape gestures is to be accounted for. In this paper, we attempt
to shed more light on the question of whether gestures are referential by
drawing on philosophical accounts of the nature of intentionality. We explore a
more minimal account of intentionality and we show that there is room for
viewing pointing gestures in apes as intentional.1 Furthermore, we aim to show
that the pointing gestures of prelinguistic children and apes are not necessarily
different in kind. As such, we provide an account that is in disagreement with
the view held by Tomasello, who is one of the most prominent defenders of the
idea that there exists a robust difference between the nature of pointing in
human beings and that of other apes.
2. A Criterion for Intentionality
An alarm call is referential if, to put it somewhat crudely, it is about a predator.
If it turned out that alarms calls are just expressions of affective states of a
particular kind, tantamount to human laughs or grunts, then they might not be
about anything; they might lack referentiality. Questions about the
referentiality of alarm calls in chimpanzees, for example, can be viewed as
similar to questions about the meaning of sounds uttered by human beings. We
see no reason to approach the question of the meaning of gestures in a different
manner than the question of the meaning of alarm calls: vocalizations issued in
response to predators and movements of the body that seem purposeful are – at
least prima facie – equally good candidates for meaningful behavior. So it would
seem that the answer to the question about the referentiality of gestures should
be articulated along the same lines: a gesture is referential if it encodes “precise
information about objects and events, independently of the speaker’s
motivational state” (Marler et al., 1992, p. 66, emphasis added). An animal
gesturing at an object is engaged in an intentional act if, crudely put, the
gesture is about the object; correspondingly, an animal’s response to a gesture
counts as intentional if it is a response to the information encoded in the
sender’s signal. If the movements of the receiver’s body turn out to be an

1

While Tomasello (2008) agrees that apes’ pointing gestures are intentional, he thinks that the kind
of intentionality involved is different than the one characterizing human infants’ pointing gestures.
Perhaps most importantly, what differentiates the latter from the former is that human infants point
declaratively and not just imperatively. In other words, they point in order to share information about
the world. A more detailed discussion of his views would go beyond the scope of this paper.
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inflexible result of prior conditioning, we would be reluctant to say the
response is intentional.
But how can we analyze the aboutness of gestures? The question is
particularly challenging in the context of dealing with non-linguistic or prelinguistic creatures, as it would seem to require an account of referentiality that
does not rely on linguistic behavior. Providing such an account is certainly a
challenging task; this is what led many ethologists to “be neutral about
philosophical issues that are not addressed directly by empirical evidence” and
to employ the notion of functional reference, which is meant to characterize
subjects who “behave as if their vocalizations encode information about events
in the external environment” (Evans, 1997).
Gestures are instances of behavior. Much contemporary research on
cognition is based on the assumption that flexible behavior is best explained by
positing mental states, which, furthermore, are usually also widely taken to be
representational. Thus, it would seem that the question of whether a certain
gesture is intentional amounts to asking whether there is a representational
mental state behind it. This move appears to be entirely legitimate if we agree
with John Searle that linguistic meaning is characterized by ‘derived’
intentionality; as he puts it, «mental states have intrinsic intentionality, material
objects in the world that are used to represent something have derived
intentionality. The most important form of derived intentionality is in language
and there is a special name in English for this form of intentionality. It is called
‘meaning’ in one of the many senses of that word» (Searle, 1996, p. 386).
Utterances would not have meaning unless creatures possessing intentional
states of mind produced them. Similarly, one might claim that gestures would
fail to have any meaning unless apes that use them to communicate with other
apes conferred it to them. The intentionality of gestures, if present, has its
source in the contents of the apes’ minds; the question of whether gestures are
intentional is, ultimately, a question about mental states. Traditionally, the
characteristic feature of the intentional realm is «reference to a content,
direction toward an object» (Brentano, 1874/1995, p. 68). We approach the
question of referentiality of gestures in apes as an instance of the philosophical
question of intentionality, and in contemporary philosophical debates this
question is usually tackled via the notion of content.2 A state (event, process,
2

Not everyone accepts that content is necessary for intentionality. Daniel D. Hutto (forthcoming)
defends the idea of a contentless intentional attitude, and a variety of nonrepresentational views of
cognition can be found in philosophy, such as Eric Schwitzgebel’s (2002) account of dispositional
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etc.) is taken to be intentional if it is has content. Thus, when we ask whether
apes’ gestures are intentional, we are asking whether the mental states behind
the gestures are contentful. In order to make things simpler, we will rephrase it
as the question of whether the apes’ gestures, and in particular the apes’
pointing gestures, have content.
Answering this question requires a criterion to delimit those states that have
content from those that do not. On the one hand, it is presumably
uncontroversial that a thermostat fails to have contentful states. On the other
hand, we take to be a constraint on theories about intentionality that an
adequate criterion should not exclude, on purely a priori grounds, nonlinguistic creatures from having intentional states; it seems plausible that, at the
very least, such a criterion should not essentially involve language; after all,
«linguistic phenomena are guides to the presence of intentionality in
ascriptions of intentionality, but they do not constitute its essence» (Crane,
1998, p. 248).
Furthermore, when attempting to answer questions about the scope of the
intentional realm, we should do our best to avoid coming up with a criterion
that makes a contentful state too easy to possess. This is a threat for theories
that aim to provide reductive accounts of intentionality and meaning. It is not
obvious that a reductionist account, namely one that explains what it is to have
an intentional state in non-intentional terms3 is possible. For example, we think
that the criterion for intentionality articulated by Leavens et al. (2004) does not
capture what it is for a mental state to be intentional or have content in the
sense that we are discussing. When Leavens and colleagues write that chimps
«are communicating intentionally because they require an audience to exhibit
the behavior and they exhibit a coordinated pattern of gestural and visual
orienting behavior that is determined by the location of both an observer and

belief and Tim Van Gelder’s (1995) dynamical systems model for cognition. The notion of
representation, however, is dominant in comparative cognition research, as illustrated by Sara
Shettleworth’s widely used textbook, where even associative learning is described as “the formation of
some sort of mental connection between representations of two stimuli” (Shettleworth, 2010, p. 105).
Though there are some appeals to nonrepresentational views of cognition, such as Louise Barrett’s
(2011) plea for animal cognition researchers to focus a bit less on representation, and a suggestive
conversation between Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Povinelli (2012) about importing embodied
approaches to animal cognition research, such approaches are not dominant in the field. Our remarks
are premised on the representational account of cognition, in order to speak to a wider audience.
3
Without appealing to intentional vocabulary.
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food. Thus, these gestures are demonstrably ‘about’ specific items in their
environment» (p. 55), it may seem as if many kinds of creatures or machines
showing sophisticated behavior would come out as intentional, and it is not
clear that they should. We think, nevertheless, that the rich empirical methods
used by Leavens and colleagues are helpful in shedding light on how to
properly distinguish between intentional and nonintentional creatures.
In looking for a criterion for intentionality that neither makes it so weak that
mechanical or merely reflexive behaviors count, nor so strong that only
linguistic behavior counts, we think that one of the standard philosophical
approaches, the one that construes intentionality as governed by normativity, is
promising. The claim that normativity governs the intentional realm needs to
be spelled out, and there are many ways of doing it. On the one hand,
normativity has been associated with correctness conditions, and it has been
taken to be a characteristic of mental states themselves insofar as correctness
conditions are essential to content. Peacocke (1996), for example,
characterizes intentional content as having a “correctness or fulfillment
condition, … determined by whether its referents have the properties the
content specifies for them” (p. 219). On the other hand, it has been claimed
that in order to count as a thinking creature, one should have an understanding
of error.4 This has led philosophers aiming to provide a more minimal account
of what it is to be in an intentional state, one that is apt to include creatures
without language, to give up normativity as a necessary component of the
intentional. Hans-Johann Glock, for example, writes that, “it now strikes me
that linking conceptual thought exclusively to rules or normativity may be onesided and overly intellectualist” (Glock, 2007), and gives up on viewing
normativity as essential for conceptual thought.
We think that this is not the best way to proceed when faced with the
challenge of making room for nonlinguistic creatures in the intentional realm
while maintaining that intentionality is governed by normativity. Rather, what is
needed, perhaps, is a rethinking of normativity itself. We take Hannah
Ginsborg’s (2011a, 2011b) account of normativity, where normativity is taken
4

Donald Davidson endorses this view. It is worth pointing out, however, that Davidson does not even
consider the possibility of the existence of nonconceptual content. Thus, it is not entirely clear where
he stands when it comes to the question of whether one can count non-linguistic creatures as
intentional. While he argues in favor of the claim that one cannot have thoughts if one lacks language,
it is not obvious that he would not be willing to construe the intentional realm as being broader than
the realm of creatures that can have conceptual thoughts.
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to provide a demarcation criterion for the intentional realm, to be very
promising. Our aim in what follows is to help to explain the way in which it
could be put to work in elucidating the nature of gestural communication in
apes. But first, let us provide an overview of her account.
3. Hannah Ginsborg’s Notion of Normativity
In response to Kripke’s (1984) skeptical challenge about the possibility of
meaning, Hannah Ginsborg (2011a, 2011b) develops an account of meaning
according to which a response is meaningful if, roughly put, it is accompanied
by a normative attitude. Her notion of normativity, however, is quite minimal
insofar as deeming a response correct or appropriate “does not depend on
conformity with an antecedently recognized rule” (p. 233). While Ginsborg’s
main concern is to elucidate linguistic meaning, her notion of normativity is
meant to shed light on concept possession more generally. 5 It is important to
make clear that while Ginsborg does not commit herself to the claim that nonlinguistic creatures have contentful states, there is nothing in her account that
appears to exclude this possibility. Her account sheds light on the difference
between “mechanical” responses and intentional ones, or, as she puts it,
between “responding intelligently as opposed to reflexively or robotically”
(2011a, pp. 170–171). According to Ginsborg, what distinguishes intelligent
responses from the non-intelligent ones is what she calls “the consciousness of
primitive normativity” (2011a, 2011b). That is, if a creature’s response to the
world is accompanied by a sense of the appropriateness of that response, the
response deserves to be viewed as intentional and further, the creature can be
said to be responding meaningfully or with understanding.6 As she puts it,
We can make sense of … having a ‘primitive’ consciousness of the appropriateness of his
response which does not depend on the antecedent grasp of a rule or standard
determining that response as correct or incorrect, or even on the awareness that there is
such a rule or standard. (Ginsborg, 2011b, p. 169)
5

She writes, “[t]he phenomenon I am illustrating is not restricted to numerical examples, but pervades
concept acquisition and language learning more generally” "(2011b, p. 235).
6
This does not entail, however, that any intentional response requires conscious deliberation. At least
some intentional behavior is, arguably, automatic. The claim defended in this paper is merely that a
creature can be said to belong to the intentional realm as soon as she has the sense of primitive
appropriateness, which does require consciousness. This criterion, however, does not demand that
every response of a full-blown intentional creature be conscious. We thank David Leavens for raising
this question.
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Ginsborg discusses the example of a child who is not yet in command of
color concepts and who is asked to sort green objects. What does it take in
order to see the child as sufficiently competent with this task for us to say that
she has the concept of green? According to Ginsborg, “what seems to be
needed, if her becoming competent in the activity of sorting green things is to
amount to her ‘catching on’ to what green things have in common, is that, in
acquiring that competence, she comes to see the green things as in some sense
‘belonging’ together” (2011a, p. 238). In other words, discriminating green
from non-green is not sufficient; the child must perform the discrimination
with the sense that the green objects fit or belong together or that they ought to
be a part of the same pile. Once the child reaches this stage, if someone tosses a
red object in her pile of green objects, she will have a sense of a lack of
appropriateness characterizing the presence of the red object. However, given
that she is not yet a language user, she will be unable to articulate the sense in
which the action of tossing a red object in the pile lacks appropriateness. As
Ginsborg makes it clear, the child does not view the move of including a red
object as incorrect because she is not yet in possession of rules or concepts,
which is to say that she cannot distinguish incorrect actions from actions to
which the distinction between correctness and incorrectness does not apply. At
this stage, which is tantamount to the very leap into the intentional realm,
correctness or appropriateness is contrasted with lack of correctness or
appropriateness, rather than with incorrectness or inappropriateness. The
sense of appropriateness is, according to Ginsborg, precisely consciousness of
primitive normativity.7
While Ginsborg seems to take the idea of taking one’s own responses to be
appropriate as equivalent with the idea of having a sense that the objects in the
sorted pile belong together, we will take the notion of primitive normativity to
require that the sorting behavior be accompanied by the sense that the sorted
objects fit or belong together (the idea of things belonging together being a
normative one), without it necessarily being accompanied by the sense that
one’s response to the pile of objects is appropriate. The reason is that the
7

Furthermore, what the example of categorizing objects based on color shows, it seems to us, is that
having the attitude of primitive normativity does not require prior experience nor encountered
regularities; it is, at the very least, conceivable that a child senses that green objects fit together upon
seeing the pile of objects for the very first time. Also, having the attitude of primitive normativity does
not amount to understanding goal-directedness; the latter does seem to require prior experience. We
thank Nathalie George for raising these questions.
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taking of one’s own responses to be appropriate may be something that
requires metacognition, understood as the ability to have second-order mental
states.8 Ginsborg’s account of normativity is minimal: in order to grasp the idea
of correctness or appropriateness, one does not need to grasp rules. If she is
right, the path to becoming a full-blown linguistic creature necessarily involves
a stage at which one understands oughts without being able to articulate one’s
understanding. It is at this stage that the boundary between intentional and
non-intentional creatures may be adequately drawn. This stage precedes the
acquisition of language in humans and — more importantly for our aims — there
is no prima facie reason to think that it does not characterize the cognitive
evolution of other primates.
4. Normativity without Language or Metacognition
The question we address now is that of whether empirical findings are
consistent with Ginsborg’s view. Before we examine existing data, it is worth
emphasizing that Ginsborg’s notion of primitive normativity is meant to supply
“a condition of possibility of meaning and understanding” (2011a, p. 179) and
that her account is nonreductionist, insofar as descriptions in purely physical
terms, or what she calls “nonintentionally characterized regularities” cannot, in
principle, offer a full account of intentional responses. Strictly speaking, one
cannot devise a definitive empirical test for the presence of primitive
normativity.9 We could ask, however, if the claim that lies at the core of
Ginsborg’s account, namely that a creature may have a sense of appropriateness
or correctness without an antecedent grasp of any norm, and without the
awareness that norms might exist, appears to be consistent with empirical
findings. Interestingly, research on the moral psychology of human children as
well as other apes would seem to provide evidence that non-linguistic
individuals are sensitive to normativity before they are able to pass standard
false belief tasks.10
8

See Andrews (2012) for an argument against the claim that metacognition is necessary for being an
intentional creature.
9
Due to the fact that mental state attribution essentially requires interpretation, this seems to present a
problem for any experimental approach involving questions about mental states (consider
experimental paradigms aiming to establish the presence of theory of mind in human infants, children,
and apes).
10
The received view is that children are not able to mindread until around age 4 (Wellman et al.,
2001), though some studies with infants have suggested to some that humans can mindread at 15
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While psychologists often speak of children’s norm learning, their focus is
less on the acquisition of normative concepts and more on the sense that there
is a right way of doing things. We believe that this is consistent with Ginsborg’s
claim that, crudely put, primitive normativity does not require a grasp of
explicit norms. At a very young age, children are already learning about how
things ought to be done, or what is appropriate, without necessarily coming to
grasp normative concepts or principles that they could use to justify or explain
appropriateness. The growing data set on children’s concern with correct
behavior reflects what developmentalists, educators, and parents have long
observed, namely that between 2 and 3 years of age, children become
concerned with proper behavior, sometimes to the point of obsession (Rakoczy
et al., 2008; 2009; Rakoczy, 2008). Furthermore, this concern seems to arise
before anything like developed mindreading abilities emerge.
Evidence that even prelinguistic infants are sensitive to how one should
behave comes from the seminal study done by Hamlin and colleagues (2007),
which finds that as early as 6 months of age, infants begin to prefer some agents
over others based on the agents’ actions toward others. Using a violation of
expectation paradigm and a reaching paradigm, researchers found that infants
prefer a character that helps another actor to a character that hinders another
actor. The authors conclude that even preverbal infants make normative
assessments about others based on their actions. However, because we are
dealing with prelinguistic infants that presumably lack sophisticated moral
concepts (such as those that allow adults to distinguish between the just, the
good, and the right), it is difficult to characterize the content of such
assessments beyond a simple catagorization into behavior that is correct and
behavior that lacks correctness. Whatever the content turns out to be, it would
seem that children use their ability to make such categorizations in order to
form judgments about epistemic reliability. By 14 months of age, infants will
more often follow a perceiver who had a prior reasonable response to a
perception (e.g., looking excited when finding a toy in a container) as

months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Baillargeon et al., 2010). We are skeptical of those claims, and
think that children are not fully-fledged mindreaders until long after they are able to pass standard false
belief tasks (Andrews, 2012). This is not to deny that very young children have a social sense, that they
are developing folk psychologists, or that they are sensitive to other’s emotions and goals. Rather, the
claim that young children are not mindreaders is the claim that they lack the metacognitive ability to
consider beliefs and to attribute beliefs to others.
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compared with a perceiver who did not (e.g., by acting excited when looking
into a container that didn’t hold a toy) (Chow et al., 2008).
Older pre-school children also show striking sensitivity to correct and
incorrect behavior. Like infants, they are quite choosy about whom they learn
from. For example, children preferentially learn from prestigious individuals,
prestigious individuals being defined as those who get more attention from
bystanders (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). In another study, researchers found
that 3- and 4-year-old children preferentially learn about artifacts from a person
«to whom other learners have preferentially attended or deferred» (Chudek et
al., 2012, p. 47). Children first watch a clip in which bystanders pay attention
to the one model (the prestige model) and not to the other in either an artifact
or food condition. Next, the subjects see the two models manipulate the same
novel artifact by using different tools, or eating or drinking two different novel
foods or beverages. Finally, when the children are asked to choose which
models’ behavior to imitate, around 70% of the subjects choose the prestigious
model so long as the behavior is in the same domain in which the children were
given the prestige cue; children do not generalize prestige across contexts.
Young children are quite good at distinguishing other contexts in which a
demonstrator is reliable. When an adult demonstrator acts as though she knows
how to use an object, 3-year-old children object strenuously when they see a
puppet manipulate the object in a different way. But when the adult
demonstrator acts as though she is unfamiliar with the object and invents a way
of manipulating it, children do not object when the puppet later engages
differently with the object (Schmidt et al., 2010). This study suggests that
children are sensitive to normative contexts and that they are strong enforcers
of “proper” behavior. Moreover, the adult demonstrator does not use
normative language in either of the two conditions; the only thing that children
could react to, it would seem, is “the expression of an attitude” (Schmidt et al.,
2010, p. 6). As such, when discussing the results of the experiment, the
authors write that “it does not seem to be the case that young children need
actions to be explicitly marked normatively, with a normative language, to
identify them as normatively governed, nor do they need them to have
conventional labels” (ibid.). Children, it seems, are capable of having normative
reactions in the absence of linguistic expression.
When it comes to understanding of normativity in apes, there is
significantly less in the way of evidence. As far as we know, no experimental
research along the lines of the infant studies described above has been done.
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There are, however, some ethological data showing that chimpanzees have
standards of behavior. In a recent paper, Rudolf von Rohr and colleagues
discuss ample evidence from the field concerning the special status of infants in
chimpanzee communities. Newborns are objects of great attention, and adult
chimpanzees will observe the infants, but not approach or touch them. On the
other hand, juveniles and older infants will try to approach or touch the new
infant; this leads the mother to respond defensively. Thus, young chimpanzees
quickly learn that infants should be left alone. Later, when an infant is old
enough to venture away from his mother, adults are lenient toward him. Adults
are extremely tolerant of infants climbing over them and even stealing their
food or tools and they self-handicap when playing with infants. Furthermore,
incidents of infanticide seem to trigger “massive reactions from male as well as
female bystanders, including vocal protests such as ‘waa’ barking, persistent
screaming, highly aroused individuals and even risky behaviour such as
interventions and/or coalitionary defence of the mother-infant pair” (Rudolf
van Rohr et al., 2011, p. 14). This leads the authors to think that chimpanzees
might form “social expectations about the way in which others should be
treated and react accordingly upon their violation,” and that they might possess
“proto social norms” (Rudolf van Rohr et al., 2011, p. 20). In another study,
Rudolf van Rohr and colleagues present and discuss findings related to the
presence of policing, understood as «impartial interventions by third parties in
ongoing conflicts» (2012, p. 1), in groups of chimpanzees and hypothesize
that policing may count as evidence of a “community concern,” which can be
seen as a precursor of social norms.
Another way of looking at this evidence is by taking it as an indication that
chimpanzees may have a sense of what ought to be done, and that they possess
something along the lines of Ginsborg’s notion of primitive normativity.
Further, the fact that prelinguistic humans who lack mindreading abilities show
sensitivity to social norms demonstrates that neither language nor mindreading
is necessary for categorizing things as appropriate or as lacking
appropriateness. Insofar as such studies convincingly show that very young
children and apes are sensitive to oughts, it would seem that the admission into
the normative realm does not require the ability to justify or give reasons for
action and, as such, it does not require mindreading and it does not require
language. Despite the fact that infant humans and adult chimpanzees are unable
to justify their actions, they are able to sort individuals into categories and to
learn that some objects are for particular purposes as well as that only some
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ways of acting are appropriate. These findings seem to support the claim that
creatures that lack mindreading skills as well as linguistic abilities may
nonetheless understand oughts.
5. Are Ape Pointing Signals Intentional?
We now turn to the question of whether apes’ pointing gestures are
intentional. Gestures are usually defined in terms of intentional bodily actions
that are performed with the goal of expressing meaning (Kendon, 2004). But
the question tackled here is precisely whether nonhuman bodily actions are
intentional, or apt to express meaning. We already saw that Pika & Liebal
(2012) take for granted that gestural communication is intentional. There is
ample evidence that primates use bodily movements for functional
communication, but are the gestures intentional in the more robust sense that
we attempted to spell out? To answer this question, we need to examine more
closely the contexts in which such gestures are used. In light of Ginsborg’s
account, we can ask whether the kind of responses expressed by the gestures
meet the normativity constraint.
We know that there is individual variability in the repertoires of gestures
among great apes (Call & Tomasello, 2007), flexible use of gestures derived
from species-typical displays (Genty et al., 2009), multi-modal communicative
combinations (Leavens et al., 2010; Pollick & de Waal, 2007; Tanner,
Patterson, & Byrne, 1996), gestural sequences or phrases (Genty & Byrne,
2010; Tanner 2004), and negotiation or co-regulation within communicative
interactions, including elaborations (Cartmill & Byrne, 2007; Leavens et al.,
2005; 2010). We know that apes engage in various kinds of gesture, including
pointing: standardized species or group specific gestures that are otherwise
arbitrary or non-iconic (see Blake, 2004 for a review, e.g. McGrew and Tutin,
1978), iconic gestures in which the referent resembles the gesture (Bates et al.,
1975; Tanner et al., 2006, Tanner & Byrne, 1996), and pantomime, which
involves more elaborate acting out of desired ends in an idiosyncratic way
(Russon & Andrews, 2011a; 2011b). Pointing, iconic gestures, and
pantomime may be important keys to understanding great apes’ gestures given
their remarkable motor flexibility and the opportunities we have for observing
their production and comprehension. What kind of evidence would be required
in order to count these behaviors as intentional in light of Ginsborg’s criterion?
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Famously, Call and colleagues found that chimpanzees engaged in more
knocking, poking, and pushing when humans were unwilling to give them food
as compared with humans who were merely unable to supply the food,
suggesting that apes track a difference between intentional and unintentional
action (Call et al., 2004). However, following Ginsborg’s requirement for
intentionality, we need to know more about the quality of the behavioral
responses in order to determine whether the chimpanzees perceived the
experimenter as violating an ought. In one condition of Call and colleagues’
experiment, the experimenter was unable to offer a grape because the grape
was out of the experimenter’s sight. The chimpanzees engaged in fewer
behaviors in this condition, thereby suggesting that they understood that the
experimenter wasn’t able to supply the food under those circumstances. But
what was not coded is whether the chimpanzees attempted to attract the
experimenter’s attention, regardless of the way in which the criterion might be
operationalized. For example, we don’t know whether the chimpanzees
pointed, and we don’t know how they responded to points that were not
followed.
We suggest that there are, at the very least, two very promising lines of
empirical investigation. Both of them are based on the thought that, in the
empirical evidence that we gather, we should look for indications of
expectations regarding what should follow the gestures. The first promising
approach follows the strategy of Leavens et al., (2005, 2010) and Cartmill &
Byrne (2007) and focuses on elaborations of communicative signals in the face
of misunderstandings. We know that children elaborate when their original
message did not result in the appropriate response and they do so both verbally
and gesturally from the time they begin to use words (Gallagher, 1977; Wilcox
& Webster, 1980; Wilcox & Howse, 1982). Cartmill & Byrne (2007) found
that captive orangutans continue to gesture until they receive the requested
food, but that they vary the types of gestures depending on the response of the
caretaker. If the orangutans only receive part of the food they request, they will
repeat the original gesture. However, if the caretaker engages in an incorrect
behavior, such as bringing the wrong food, the orangutans change their
gesture, or elaborate on the original one.
Elaborations, repetitions, and substitutions of gestures are all examples of
behaviors that indicate recognition of error. Using such gestures appropriately
in the face of a failed message suggests that the gesturing individual is aware
that something didn’t work the way it should; if the animal responded to the
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inappropriate reaction by taking it to be an instance of unfulfilled desire rather
than an instance of error, we would expect the kind of protesting gestures that
apes provided in the Call et al., (2004) study. By elaborating on a gesture in the
face of an unfulfilled desire, the individual seems to understand that the
caregiver is willing and able, but simply misguided. When a message is sent and
the communicative partner does not respond as she ought to — as one typically
does in that context — the expected response for an individual with primitive
normativity is to see the noncompliance as lacking appropriateness.
Elaborations in terms of either giving the same signal with more vigor or
changing the signal, along the lines that Leavens et al., (2005) also advocate,
constitute, it seems to us, evidence of primitive normativity. By changing the
signal, the communicator is indicating that the appropriate response to the
signal has not been given. Thus, it would seem that the research on
elaborations in the face of failed messages touches upon the kind of normativity
that Ginsborg takes to be the mark of intentionality. Further data on apes’
responses to communicative partners’ inappropriate use of symbols could help
to accumulate further evidence in favor of ape intentionality when it comes to
gestures such as pointing. For example, following Wittgenstein’s remark11
about points being followed backwards, one test may be to introduce a naïve
individual into a pointing community who uses points backwards. We might
examine whether other individuals protest at the incorrect use of the point.12
While the variety of the kinds of elaborations that apes are able to engage in
belies this explanation (see, e.g., Russon & Andrews, 2011a), skeptics may
object that elaborations in such contexts reflect prior reinforcement patterns
and the change in response is a result of a weakening of the association, which
is not reinforced. Furthermore, since we are particularly interested in an
individual’s recognizing that her own actions are constrained by oughts, we will
also want to determine whether the subjects have reactions towards their own
11

Wittgenstein gives the example of a person to whom it comes naturally “to react to the gesture of
pointing with the hand by looking in the direction from fingertip to wrist, rather than from wrist to
fingertip” (1953, §185).
12
Based on discussions with primatologists, it would seem that apes rarely protest when it comes to
other instances of communicative behavior, such as incorrect sign language use, so it seems unlikely
that we witness protests when it comes to incorrect pointing. We think, however, that there may be
other ways of determining whether apes are sensitive to the lack of appropriateness of a gesture. For
example, scientists could perhaps measure stress levels in apes faced with the situation in which a
conspecific uses pointing gestures incorrectly. Another suggestion, for which we thank Nathalie
George, is that scientists measure the rewarding value of adequate pointing.
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failed messages, and not just to failed responses on the part of the
communicative partner. In order to bolster the claim that elaborations in the
face of an unsatisfied request are intentional under Ginsborg’s criterion, we
must look for additional evidence. Recall that Ginsborg offers the example of a
child sorting green objects. Presumably, when a red block is placed in a green
pile, the child will have a sense of a lack of appropriateness that she will be
unable to articulate. We suggest that if we are able to find a similar response in
apes’ incorrect pointing gestures, we will acquire evidence that such points are
intentional and have referential content. For example, if apes could be trained
to point for an ape partner to indicate the location of food, but the apes were
trained using different gestures, the apes’ responses to what they take to be
“improper” gestures could be examined.13 Given the difficulty apes seem to
have with cooperative tasks, however, this proposal may not work. Perhaps the
proposal may be successfully worked out with bonobos, who have been
reported to share food (Hare & Kwetuenda, 2010), or with pairs observed to
cooperate, such as bonded rehabilitant orangutans or mother–child pairs. Just
as the quality of relationships between researcher and subject is important in
generating reliable data on ape cognition (Vitale, 2011), the quality of the
relationship between cooperating pairs is an important variable to consider.
The first challenge is to set up a situation in which an ape subject herself
makes a pointing error that she quickly becomes aware of, or in which she
observes another individual making a pointing error. The second challenge is
to operationalize Ginsborg’s notion of inappropriateness. To do so with
children, psychologists would use qualitative judgments about the child’s
mental state in such contexts. We think that qualitative data is precisely what is
required in order to get the ape research off the ground. Folk experts who
know the species well and who do not know the research question can be used
to code subjects’ responses to errors (Andrews, 2009; 2011). Paradigms used
with human infants, such as violation of expectation and preferential looking
paradigms, have been used to examine the expectations of human infants (and
some nonhuman species). Skeptics will perhaps be worried about the reliance
on qualitative data, but we believe that the independence of the coders together
with the corroborative findings on elaborations should help to temper such
worries. Further, skeptics need to realize that such research has a partner in
guilt, namely human infant and child psychology, where, for example, violation
13

Thanks to Richard Moore for this suggestion.
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of expectation studies are based on lay experts’ opinions about when infants are
surprised.14 If we were to find that apes’ qualitative responses to incorrect
points are different in kind from their responses in other situations (for
example, situations in which they fail to get food), and that the response occurs
before the researcher reveals the correct answer, we would have evidence that
the ape relies on correctness conditions for pointing. This leads us to the final
point we aim to address in the paper, namely, the question of what the contents
of the points are.
6. What Are the Contents of Ape’s Points?
Given the assumption that some ape behavior is plausibly interpreted as
involving a sense of primitive normativity, let us examine a popular theory
about the nature of pointing gestures in apes. Tomasello (2008) claims that
apes’ pointing results from a social intention that someone else does
something, so pointing in apes is only imperative, not declarative.15 This is in
contrast with children’s tendency to use pointing declaratively at an early age.
This difference, Tomasello claims, reflects large cultural differences between
humans and the other apes: while humans are cooperative and tend toward
wanting to share information, resources, and work, the other apes fail to have
such cooperative impulses.
We think that a greater attention to the intentional realm as delimited by the
presence of primitive normativity can be used to, at the very least, cast some
doubt on Tomasello’s view. For Tomasello, ape pointing is an instance of what
he calls attention-getting gestures; more specifically, Tomasello claims that
14

Consider tasks in which infants are presented with a stimulus that is shown to them again and again
until they get bored. We supposedly know that the infant is bored because she stops looking at the
stimulus, but this is just a folk psychological interpretation of behavior. In the next phase the infant is
shown a new stimulus, and if she looks longer at it, researchers supposedly know that the new stimulus
is perceived as different — the second folk psychological interpretation. If the infant doesn’t look
longer at the new stimulus, then researchers supposedly know that the stimulus is the same to the
infant — yet a third interpretative move. The researchers are just measuring looking time, and looking
time is only interesting if it shows something. By interpreting looking time as interest or surprise, the
researchers draw conclusions about infant cognition. But there is no independent confirmation of this
interpretation — it is the starting position that is needed to get research off the ground. Without the
ability to make such assumptions, we would have no means for engaging in infant cognition research.
15
This distinction has been made by Bates et al., (1975) in their work on preverbal communication in
human children. Gestures and speech can be said to be either imperative if they function as requests or
declarative if they function as attempts to share information about the world.
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many apes learn how to point during their interactions with human beings in a
way that makes pointing “a powerful extension of their natural attentiongetting gestures” (2008, p. 34). What is characteristic of attention-getting
gestures is that, “the communicator has some action he wants from the
recipient — what we may call his social intention — and to attain this he attempts
to draw the recipient’s attention to something … in the expectation that if she
looks where he wishes, she will do as he wishes” (2008, p. 29). Tomasello
motivates this view by claiming that, on the one hand, apes’ pointing gestures
are expressions of requests, and, on the other hand, apes don’t seem to
comprehend points when the latter are made declaratively; they seem to
comprehend only imperative pointing. What this entails is that, in the case of
non-human apes, the content of the point is, in a sense, limited to another ape’s
behavior. Therefore, it is safe to claim that for Tomasello there seems to be a
gap between human pointing, which is genuinely referential, and ape pointing,
which is not.16
However, while the phenomenon of sharing information has not been
systematically addressed, some field researchers do speak of cases of in which
apes share information. Rehabilitant orangutans, for example, have been
observed to show caregivers fruits by presenting them on their extended lower
lip; the caregivers are allowed to examine the fruits, but if they fail to return
them, the orangutans will often become agitated (Andrews, unpublished data).
In pantomime communication episodes, orangutans have been observed to
share information with a communicative partner. In one instance, an infant
orangutan named Kikan was observed by a field assistant, Agnes, to be
mouthing her foot. When Agnes investigated, she noticed a stone embedded in
Kikan’s foot, so she picked out the stone with a pencil, and then dabbed the
wound with some latex from a leaf. Days later, Kikan grabbed Agnes’s arm, and
when she turned to look Kikan held out her foot, picked a leaf and dabbed it
with the stem, just as Agnes had done to close the wound. When Agnes looked
closely, she saw that the wound had healed. Then Kikan walked away (Russon
& Andrews, 2011b). Because there was no functional interpretation of this
behavior, it was interpreted as sharing information by letting Agnes know that
her doctoring had worked.

16

When Tomasello refers to the referentiality of gestures, he uses scare quotes, and motivates his
choice by saying that “what apes are doing is a precursor to human reference while differing in some
respects” (2008, p. 29).
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Tomasello is skeptical of such interpretations, claiming that the behaviors
may be accidents, and that only systematic experimental work can determine
whether an orangutan desires to share attention or to inform. We think that by
establishing normativity in the context of ape pointing, we would also establish
that there is no robust difference between the points of apes and those of
human children; the way in which pointing gestures are used becomes less
relevant. Empirical evidence that apes understand appropriateness when it
comes to pointing would show that there is more to it than a mere extension of
their natural attention-getting gestures, which lack genuine referentiality.
Understanding correctness or appropriateness requires more than “the
communicator’s social intention that the recipient see something, which he
expects, based on his intentional understanding (in combination with past
experience), will most likely lead her to do what he wants” (Tomasello, 2008,
p. 50). It is, rather, an understanding that this is how things should go. So, even
if apes generally use points to request objects, their awareness that there is a
right way to request objects would suggest that their points are referential
rather than merely procedural. The reference need not be the object pointed at,
but may be the proper behavior associated with the request. As such, there may
be no difference in kind between the pointing gestures of human infants and
those of other apes.
7. Conclusion
Rather than seeing ape pointing as some kind of truncated reaching, we suggest
that pointing should be viewed as a rich signal involving a basic understanding
of the way things ought to be done and not just of how things are done. By
relying on Ginsborg’s criterion for intentionality, researchers can develop
additional tasks to examine the existence of primitive normativity in pointing
and other ape gestures.
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